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II.
SELECTION OF VICE-PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES
MR. FEERICK: I would like to pose a threshold question and

leave
it to the experts to carry the discussion: should we change the present
selection process, and if so, how should it be changed?
Would anybody care to start off?
MR. MITCHELL: I would be glad to start it off because I think that
I have, perhaps, an advantage.., in that I have for many years been
to both political conventions, and from my observation the conventions have increasingly become places where responsible people attend
but have very little opportunity to have any impact on what happens.
So it does seem to me that our system of choosing the top candidates at
the convention as we now do is a good system but it needs to be
improved by giving those who attend some real freedom to act.
With respect to the Vice-Presidency, I think that could be achieved
by having the nominee for the Presidency choose a list of people with
whom he could be compatible, and then have the delegates vote on
which of that group would be the running mate of the Presidential
candidate. I would not think that the other systems that have been
proposed would be very good for the country.
MR. FEERICK: Under your suggestion, if the Presidential candidate
or incumbent President wanted to nominate one person for the position, I would take it that he would be forced, as a result of the
requirement to advance a list, to add to that one person the names of
several additional people.
MR. MITCHELL: I would think that would be good. But I would
hope that a Presidential nominee would have enough friends to give at
least several names. At least, at all of the conventions I have ever
attended for the last twenty-five years or so, I have heard a number of
names bandied around, and indeed we now know that at the most
recent conventions, both of the nominees had several persons that they
considered or were purported to have considered.
I don't really believe that it would be a problem for a Presidential
nominee to select perhaps even as many as fifty persons, one from each
state, that he felt he could be compatible with if the convention chose
any of them. But I don't believe it would be wise to go outside of the
list that the nominee might offer.
MR. FEERICK: Governor Peabody?
Gov. PEABODY: I think it would be helpful in determining how we
are going to change the selection process to determine what our
standards or criteria are for the selection of the Vice-Presidential
nominee. And I think that probably there is little difference of opinion
on the subject, although there have been differences in practice, that
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the person should be qualified and capable to be President of the
United States. That certainly is the number one consideration.
When you get to number two, there may be some disagreement. I
think that the way it has worked out, people would have to say the
person has got to be someone who can help the ticket get elected; that
certainly is very, very important.
Third, people have said that he must be compatible with the
President.
And I come in with number four very strongly, and something that I
think this group should give a lot more attention to, the question of
popular selection of the Vice-President. Because there is no question
that the people of the United States-and they exhibit this in poll after
poll, one most recently taken by NBC this week and announced by
John Chancellor-people are very upset with the way that we select
our Vice-President and they think people should have more of an
opportunity to select the Vice-President.
I, having campaigned for Vice-President, found that after people got
over the shock of someone running for the office and not waiting to be
appointed to it, they felt very strongly on this subject, so that I say one
of the standards should be popular selection. And if we can agree on
that, which I think we may have trouble with at this Symposium
because popular selection and compatibility run counter to one another, my feeling is that then you come to the role that the VicePresident should play. I would change his role dramatically from what
it is now, which is a big-nothing role where he is always in the way of
the President, to give him a full vote in the Senate. If you change that
role, then you can select him more on a popular basis.
My proposal would be to provide three ways in which a person
would be eligible to be nominated as a vice-presidential candidate.
One is as a candidate in a state primary for President or VicePresident during the Presidential campaign. The second is as an
announced candidate for Vice-President, having notified his party's
national committee, within two weeks before the opening of the
convention. And the third is by being recommended by a Presidential
candidate within two weeks before the convention. And then the
opportunity to have your name lodged with the convention would
close.
In this way, the delegates, the party, the press, the people, would
have a chance to analyze the qualifications of the candidate and would
be able to voice their feelings in advance of the selection and it would
not be left to that late-night effort by Presidential nominees to hurriedly select their running mates.
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MR. READ: It occurs to me that perhaps we are approaching this in
the wrong direction, and maybe we should be discussing the reform of
the duties of the office of Vice-President first. I think that we have to
have in mind what the Vice-President is to do, and then design a
method of selecting the Vice-President that will best insure that
whoever is selected will be able to do those duties that we have defined
or set out for him.
In this line of thought, it has just occurred to me sitting here that
perhaps a reverse of what Clarence Mitchell proposed here might be a
viable way, particularly if we were to increase the executive responsibilities of the Vice-Presidency, and that would be to have some
defined role within the political party structure whereby the party
would nominate, say, five or ten individuals deemed qualified for the
Vice-Presidency, and then let the Presidential nominee make the
selection from among that list the one who would be most suited to
help him in the executive departments of the government.
Perhaps if we were to expand the legislative role of the VicePresidency, then perhaps what Mr. Mitchell proposed would be best,
and that would be to let the delegates to the convention from around
the country select from among a list-either of candidates selected by
the Presidential nominee, or of declared candidates, as Governor
Peabody has proposed. But I think we have to have some way of
defining the role of the Vice-Presidency first, and then picking somebody to fill that role.
PROF. SCHLESINGER: The first question is whether the office is
worth preserving. And to decide that, I think the question is whether
the office can be endowed-as it never has been in the past-with
duties to make it full-time work for an intelligent, mature man. I think
that that really is the basic problem.
The Vice-President of the United States has one serious job: that is
to wait around for the President to die. He does nothing else. It is for
this reason it tends to be a demoralizing, wasting, frustrating and
damaging job to most Vice-Presidents.
We have had 41 Vice-Presidents in American history. No President,
in spite of the assurances that all modern Presidents make, has ever
given his Vice-President any serious duties. I do believe that before we
get into the details and somewhat scholastic argument about which
way to nominate a Vice-President, we ought to consider whether we
ought to have a Vice-President at all, and as part of that whether we
can reverse the whole course of American history and begin to give the
Vice-President a serious role in working for the government. I think
these are the antecedent problems.
DEAN REEDY: I hate to revive anything as discredited as the
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domino theory, but looking at this thing, the problems that I have with
all of these proposals are that we push over one domino and an awful
lot of others fall in place.
I don't think you can give the Vice-President anything meaningful
unless you are willing to revise the Constitution in such a way that
executive authority is divided. The basic problem with the VicePresidential office is that we have the written Constitution which states
that all of the executive powers are in the hands of one man. And from
my own personal observation, both under Vice-Presidential direction
and under Presidential direction, and from observations made by
friends of mine who have been in other administrations, it has become
very obvious to me that Presidents are quite jealous of that exclusive
possession of power and that also they have all sorts of ways of
maintaining it, regardless of what the law says.
I think here you are in a realm which law cannot reach, and that if
you are going to enlarge the office of the Vice-President, I think then
you have to go into the Constitution itself and find some way in which
you can have a multiple executive branch of the government, or
possibly go to a parliamentary system where you can make the cabinet
officers responsible to the parliament rather than to the President.
When you start looking at it from that standpoint, you run into a
number of problems. There is one point I would like to make here
about the nomination process. When we talk about reforming, we are
not talking about substituting one law for another, we are not talking
about amending a law. What we are talking about is writing a law in a
field where no law exists.
Up to this point, the selection of the Vice-President is a thing that
has arisen by an evolutionary process. It has arisen out of custom. It
has arisen out of responses to the system. And, therefore, what we
have to realize is that what we are doing is saying that an evolutionary
process does not satisfy us and that we are intent on changing
evolution. Now that is not, in and of itself, a reason for not doing it
but it is a reason for examining why things are the way they are, and I
think the reason things are the way they are is because of our
governmental structure.
We have one Chief Executive, period. And I think that if you start
defining the role of the Vice-President, you are going to find that
Presidents will develop a remarkable faculty for draining those roles of
all meaning. It is a very simple thing to do, you know. The buck stops
at one certain desk. It is easy to see that all subordinate agencies will
either fit into that structure, or get sucked dry of any juice and vitality.
And I rather think that if you are talking about changing the VicePresidency, then essentially you have three alternatives: one is leave it
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where it is; second, abolish it; or, third, change not the VicePresidency but the constitutional structure insofar as it applies to
executive power.
SENATOR BAYH: I have had no experience at all in what really goes
on in the mind of a Presidential nominee. I was foolish enough at one
time in my life to have some thoughts go on in the mind of a would-be
Presidential nominee, so I have given a little tangential thought to the
qualifications and how you would proceed, but that is not like being in
on the final decision-making process.
We have heard from two who have a pretty good idea, were
involved in this process, and can speak with some authority as to what
really happens. We have another to my right who more recently was
involved and perhaps some of the rest of you have been. I have had
the opportunity to hear some of these gentlemen express their thoughts
before a Constitutional Amendments Subcommittee 5 and I guess I
come to this Symposium as a realist who, hopefully, hasn't lost all of
his idealism.
Realistically, ladies and gentlemen, we are talking about making
basic changes, and as to those that have been suggested here or have
been referred to here, we are talking about having to convince
two-thirds of the United States Senate and two-thirds of the House of
Representatives and three-quarters of the state legislatures to make the
change. Despite the fact that we have gone through a rather harrowing
experience which I hope will convince us to change the way we choose
both President and Vice-President and to have a direct popular decision made, I do not believe there is enough support there for some of
the ideas which may be theoretically sound, like disposing of the
Vice-Presidency, which Arthur presents a very persuasive case for, and
some of the ideas like those Chuck presents for the Vice-President out
there running on his own; I can't see that we are going to have that
kind of support there. And I ask myself whether we really want it or
not.
Now, the popular element, the idea of a popular vote, disturbs me. I
am a great election man and normally I would say, "Let's have a
special election," but as you look at the experiences that surround this,
the only experiences I have had with change, death or resignation,
there is a great need for somebody to come along and say, "Okay, let's
put it all together, let's have restored faith in the system of government." And despite my strong support of the direct election process, at
5. Senator Bayh has served as chairman of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary since 1963.
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a time when we need unity, at a time when we need solidarity, an
election is a very divisive instrumentality. If you have a Vice-President
there, we have seen the people willing to accept that person and abide
by his leadership, and for that reason I think the present system is
about the best we can have.
. * . Some here disagree with the results of the twenty-fifth amendment and I guess as one of the putative fathers, I have a little lack of
objectivity. But in the process of putting that together, I came to the
conclusion that there is only one way you can have a more effective
Vice-President while he is serving, and that is to have him closer to the
President, more reliable to the President, not chosen by a separate
clique. The practical matter is, there is only one Executive, and I don't
think we want the Vice-President to have a political base of his own
and to constantly divide and contest for the decision-making process
with the President. And I think the present system of letting the
Presidential nominee determine who that Vice-Presidential nominee is,
having a major role in that, is indispensable.
The matter that concerns me is time, pure and simple time. Now,
the Kennedy study, 6 that suggests a change in the format of the
conventions, I think is a step in the right direction. I don't think it goes
quite far enough, frankly, and I would be prepared, realist as I am, to
take a little broader step. I would like Mr. Kirbo to describe some of
the thoughts, if he would, that went on during the very wonderful
period of relative leisure in which the Carter campaign had a chance to
think about this. What concerns me is that too many nominees do not
have a chance to give ultimate consideration, they don't know what all
their options are going to be because they don't know whether they are
going to win, and this time we had a chance to get a studied thought
process. And one of the ideas that I suggested-but I am surely not
wedded to-is to go a step further than the Kennedy study and say
there is nothing sacrosanct about the Vice-President being chosen by
the convention. Bob Griffin says we ought to go the twenty-fifth
amendment route. I would rather have the people involved in the
choice.
What I suggest is we consider saying, "All right, we go home, the
convention is adjourned;" the nominee then has a chance to think
6. Institute of Politics, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Report
of the Study Group on Vice-Presidential Selection (June 14, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Harvard
Study]. The Institute's substantive recommendations were that the major parties (a) rearrange
their convention schedules to allow more time for considering Vice-Presidential candidates, (b)
establish advisory committees to assist Presidential candidates and the convention in selection,
and (c) request that Presidential contenders submit lists of preferred running mates to the
advisory committees.
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about it, and he sends a secret ballot to all the delegates-there can be
one name on there or two or three names-and then the delegates vote
on that. That way you have the people involved in the situation, but
they are people who are directly responsible to the President, and then
in the final analysis the democratic process of the people determining
who their President and Vice-President are going to be, the general
election, really makes it democratic in the final sense.
MR. FEERICK:

I wanted to speak to the last comment, Senator.

You would be willing to risk, I take it, with your suggestion, the
potential negative impact on the ticket were the presidential candidate's choice rejected in that secret ballot, in that two or three-day
period after the convention?
SENATOR BAYH:
Yes, I am, and I am realistic enough to know
there is probably going to be one person among equals on that list who
is a little more equal than anybody else, and many of the delegates and
those to whom the delegates respond are going to have a way to find
out who that most equal is. Nevertheless, the present process, the
President absolutely rubber-stamping the man who history has shown
could very well be his successor, is not there. The delegates are up in
arms and the nominee does try to force someone on them, but there is
a chance of having the democratic process work.
I don't believe there is just one person that automatically fits the
role. I think Governor Carter did a fantastic job of picking the person,
who I just happen to believe was the best person from the beginning,
but he had time to think about this.
PROF. KIRBY:
I want to support the notion that the twenty-fifth
amendment deserves some applause and note the fact that it places our
subject in a whole new perspective. I just finished reading the Chairman's book on the twenty-fifth amendment7 which I think is must
reading for anyone interested in this subject. For 37 years between
1841 and 1965 the Vice-Presidency was vacant as a result of the
Vice-President succeeding the President.
PROF. SCHLESINGER: No harm came to the country as a result of
that.
PROF. KIRBY:
No, but not once did the succession go beyond the
Vice-President to a member of the Congress. We were just lucky that
our Presidents without Vice-Presidents have been such durable pieces,
because I think it would be dangerous for this country for any period
of time, especially in the nuclear age, for the Presidency to be taken
over by a member of the legislative branch, perhaps of the opposite
party, with no familiarity as to the secrets of the executive branch.
7. J. Feerick, The Twenty-Fifth Amendment (1976).
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It is very important, I think, that the Vice-President be loyal to the
President, acceptable to the President, and that is where the twentyfifth amendment has given the Vice-Presidency a new significance. We
have had a President resign, and we have also had the first dishonorable resignation of a Vice-President in our history, within the last three
years as a result of the twenty-fifth amendment. It made possible the
Agnew resignation. It made possible the Ford succession and the
Nixon resignation. So now our Vice-President just doesn't wait around
for the President to die; he waits around for the President to die, be
impeached or resign. We just don't know what impact that is going to
have on the relationship between those two offices and the stability of
the Presidency.
We need really to digest the significance of the twenty-fifth amendment and our experience of the last three or four years before we make
any major changes in our present situation.
MR. MITCHELL: Mr. Chairman, Senator Bayh said several things
that I feel I have to comment on. Because my point of view would be a
little bit different from his, I think I should preface it by saying that I
think he has made some monumental contributions with respect to
Presidential succession and I applaud him for them. But my differences with him stem from his observations with respect to the Electoral College and a little bit with respect to the succession to the
Presidency.
But with respect to succession, I think we must look at the possibilities which would arise, for example, if you abolish the present
system of electing the Vice-President and chose the Speaker and, in the
absence of the Speaker, then the President pro tern of the Senate. It
wouldn't have been so bad, in fact it might have been very good for
some of the things that I am interested in if Carl Albert had succeeded
to the Presidency as the Speaker, but it would have been a disaster if
the president pro tem, who happens to come from the State of
Mississippi, had succeeded to the Presidency of the United States.
I think we have to remember that our country is a magnificent
example of how minorities with different points of view and different
interests live together and work together. I am happy to say one of
those minorities was just elected to the Presidency of the United States,
which is a very good development in this country. But we do not yet
have in this country a system of selecting people for the national office
of the Presidency which really gives adequate safeguards to the various
minority interests, economic, racial, religious, political, in the selection
of that person. I think that was very apparent in the primary system. I
felt that was very unfortunate, because it gave an opportunity to
emphasize parochial as distinguished from national interests. In my
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opinion the convention selection process, if it is properly organized, is
the best way of selecting the national candidates. But I would say we
need a system under which we can give due weight to the interests of
all of the minority parts of this population, whether we agree with
them or not.
I think we have gotten now the safest system, the Electoral College,
convention selection, and succession as provided by the twenty-fifth
amendment. It seems to me this was a thing which would have
precipitated perhaps physical combat among opposing forces in this
country had it not been for the twenty-fifth amendment and the way in
which Congress handled that.
So I think we really ought to start with how we can improve existing
machinery in the convention, in the Electoral College process, and in
the succession process, rather than, as you pointed out, embarking on
a course which would get us involved in having to get two-thirds of the
Senate and of the House and three-fourths of the states of the Union.
PROF. KIRBY: Getting back to another question, I think it is most
important that the compatability feature spoken of by Governor Peabody be preserved in the selection of the Vice-President, because if he
is not someone the President thinks is loyal to him and capable of
continuing the mandate that the President got in the previous election,
we are not going to have the sort of relationship that we want to
prepare for succession.
Gov. PEABODY: May I speak to that compatibility very briefly.
I was a Governor who was replaced by my Lieutenant Governor.
He ran against me in a primary and defeated me and almost succeeded
me. During the course of that campaign, even though we were not
compatible, the full reins of the executive power were in my hands. He
had none. We accomplished, I felt, a remarkable success. A remarkable number of laws were passed and at no time was the state of
Massachusetts threatened by this division between the Governor, who
had all the executive power, and the Lieutenant Governor, who was
trying to unseat him. And I think that much too much attention is
given to this question of compatibility because, during twenty-two
percent of our history, we have had a Vice-President in the President's
office. As has been well pointed out by Joel Goldstein in his paper and
as is on the record, the result is that the President thus selects his
successor. Under our present system, we are permitting this great
power to be given to a President of the United States, and this is the
ruination of democracy, as I understand it.
DEAN JACKSON:

I would agree with Senator Bayh that the recom-

mendations of the Harvard group 8 were only procedural, not radical
8.

Harvard Study, supra note 5; see p. 720 infra.
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surgery. The process of vice-presidential selection is irresponsibly
primitive. But if I can take a moment to set the stage and to convey
some of our assumptions behind the rep6rt, perhaps they can provide
some better focus on our motivation for reaching those conclusions.
We began with the realization that, at the worst, American VicePresidents are selected without careful thought or advance preparation, with no time for anything but the most superficial background
checks of candidates who don't have adequate exposure, by a justchosen and exhausted Presidential nominee, advised in the last-minute
decision in the wee hours of the morning by political power brokers
and electoral mathematicians and according to standards, more important, which may be irrelevant, if not in direct conflict with the needed
qualities of competence to succeed to the Presidency.
That process is rich in tradition. In 1848 Millard Fillmore was
chosen partly on the ground that he wouldn't overshadow an undistinguished running mate and partly because he was assumed to be
anti-slavery, which he wasn't. Four years later William Rufus Van
King was picked because he was a Southerner but he had to take his
oath of office in Savannah because he was ill and dying of tuberculosis,
a fact not found an obstacle to his selection and later election.
As Joel reminded us in his very useful paper for the Symposium, 9
Chester Arthur's prior public service was limited to seven years as a
customs collector for the Port of New York; Vice-President Garrett
Hobart had never held a post higher than state legislator; and Henry
Davis was selected by a bankrupt Democratic Party because he was a
man of considerable wealth, but he was also a man of considerable
years, 80 to be precise.
Three observations stand out and really motivated this study. I will
quickly summarize.
First, a central paradox of the American political system is that, on
the one hand, we select Presidential nominees by a thorough process of
exposure and deliberation that grows ever more tortuous and grueling,
now encompassing 31 primaries over seven months. This year on the
Democratic side it involved as many as twenty substantial Presidential
candidates. But on the other hand, we continue to leave the designation of the vice-presidential contender largely to the personal judgment of the Presidential nominee, with twelve hours to spare and with
little public exposure.
Secondly, the Vice-Presidency has become the major avenue to the
Presidency itself. Of 38 elected Presidents, thirteen, more than a third,
were first Vice-Presidents. Of the thirteen Presidents this century, six
were Vice-Presidents. As Jimmy the Greek might say, the odds are
9.

See Appendix B.
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now one to two that the incumbent Vice-President will one day sit in
the Oval Office.
Thirdly, recent events, particularly the Agnew and Eagleton affairs,
suggest the present method of selection contains an unacceptable
and inherent degree of risk.
I will quickly summarize in five sentences the recommendations of
the Harvard report and perhaps they can be dissected and criticized in
their entirety.
We start first: reduce the element of risk and error by placing greater
importance on the office and the act of selection, specifically by
encouraging early deliberation and thorough background investigation
of Vice-Presidential aspirants by Presidential candidates, and wide and
formalized consultation with party officials consistent with the recommendations of the Humphrey Commission 1 ° report which encouraged
Presidential candidates to provide a list of potential Vice-Presidential
candidates in advance of the convention itself.
Second, encourage public accountability by a more open and less
secretive process starting well before the convention itself.
Third, allow more time for the candidate by rearranging the convention schedule, moving deliberations on the platform discussion from
before the Presidential nomination to after the Presidential nomination, allowing 36 hours rather than the present twelve for the selection
of the Vice-President.
Fourth, encourage extensive media coverage both before, during
and after the convention itself. I think the Vice-Presidential debates
this year helped alleviate the problem that the media in the past had
some difficulty in stressing competence to be President as the single
most important criterion. Our conclusion was that it is implausible
that the dictates of short-term political balance could be so compelling
and the available set of high quality political figures so limited that a
Presidential nominee need be forced to sacrifice competency to campaign victory in a possible successor.
MR. YOUNG: Dean Jackson cited a number of perilous, in retrospect, nineteenth-century succession problems, particularly the Arthur
problem, which is probably the single most dangerous transition that
we had.II
10. The Vice-Presidential Selection Commission of the Democratic Party, known as the
Humphrey Commission, which was created after disclosure of medical data led to Senator
Eagleton's withdrawal -from the 1972 ticket, recommended changes in Party rules to give
Presidential nominees various options for delaying the selection of running mates and to establish
an advisory and screening committee to conduct investigations before the convention. See 119
Cong. Rec. 40647 (1973); Washington Post, Dec. 14, 1973, at A2, col. 1.,
11. Vice-President Arthur's views on certain major issues of the day were the opposite of
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I would like to move on to the more recent past. It seems to me that
we need to retain essentially the present process in selecting VicePresidential nominees, because we need to have some means of judging in which direction the next administration is going to go, and the
Vice-President probably is going to be the only major appointment that
the Presidential nominee will announce in advance of the November
election. Particularly this year, we had a successful nominee in the
Democratic Party who was virtually unknown outside of Georgia at
the beginning of the year. Further, he had no record in the Congress of
the United States, no voting record. We had very little to go on at the
beginning of the year as to what course Governor Carter might follow
if he became President of the United States.
One way we began to form an opinion-and this is repeatedly
indicated in the press coverage-was to evaluate the process by which
he chose the Vice-Presidential candidate. He went about it very
carefully. He took a couple of weeks in a careful examination of about
seven principal figures, and it was widely concluded-and we will
have to see how it works out-that the choice of Senator Mondale
indicated perhaps a shift toward the liberal end of the spectrum. But
he had not announced any appointments of others in advance of the
election; we had very little to go on at this point as to which way he
would lean in his administration.
The Carter example is also useful, because, like most recent candidates, Carter had the nomination wrapped up several weeks in advance of the convention. This has been the case at probably 80 to 85
percent of the conventions in the last 30 years. For that reason, in most
cases the Presidential or the likely Presidential nominee can indeed
devote considerable time, if only he will do so, and I believe that the
several weeks that were available to Carter were sufficient for him to
make a suitable selection.
The idea of selecting the nominee at the convention means that the
new Vice-Presidential nominee will be examined carefully by the
media, he will be exposed to considerable scrutiny at the time of the
convention, and the fact that the convention at least has a veto power
over the choice of a Vice-Presidential nominee indicates that we have
at least a little bit more democracy in action because, obviously, the
delegates at the convention have been chosen at large by the public;
whereas, if you have one of these mini-conventions coming after the
national convention, perhaps with the Democratic National Committhose held by President Garfield, who died 80 days after being wounded by an assassin's bullet.
However, both men were Republicans. After Arthur became President the election of presiding
officers in both houses of Congress was delayed for some time because of concern that Democrats
would be installed and might succeed to the Presidency.
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tee or the Republican National Committee making the choice, this is
less democratic and I think a less satisfactory means of selecting the
nominee, except in a crisis brought on by a nominee's resignation as in
1972.
PROF. SCHLESINGER: I don't think that historically it is possible to
deduce the policies of the President by the man he chooses as VicePresident. Sometimes the candidate may choose a man as a running
mate because he agrees with him; sometimes he may choose him
because he represents a faction of a party he seeks to conciliate. We
know in 1924 John W. Davis selected Charles W. Bryan, Governor of
Nebraska, William Jennings Bryan's brother, as a running mate. No
one could conceivably have supposed that Mr. Davis did this because
he and Bryan were in agreement. He did it in conciliation of the Bryan
faction of the party. Franklin Roosevelt chose John Nance Garner.
It may have been true for Governor Carter and Senator Mondale;
but if so, it represents rather an exception to the standards that
Presidential candidates usually use in choosing Vice-Presidents.
MR. KiRBo: . . . The greatest defect you have is that the system
has been administered by human beings, and any system you select
with a human element entered into it, you have some odd things
happening. As for the suggestion that you lay out two people or ten
people and let a convention select among them, that is just not real.
All you are going to do is put a heavier burden on the President or the
nominee and his staff to select the man out of that ten or out of that
five that he wants, and that is exactly what is going to happen. You
are just dealing with a facade rather than something real.
SENATOR BAYH: Could I ask Mr. Kirbo a question? He has been
more intimately involved in a Vice-Presidential decision-making process in which there was a time frame that had some degree of
reasonableness than anybody else I know.
Do you believe that having the kind of time that the Pennsylvania
primary and the other facts of life gave you before the convention in
New York made it possible to make a more intelligent decision than if
that decision had had to have been made in 48 hours? Although you
might quibble with the list, and I can understand that, would it be
helpful, given a fourth ballot or fifth ballot on the Carter nomination
in New York, to then have had some sort of a vehicle which would
have given you a matter of days to perform the function that in this
election, in this nominating process, you were able to do beforehand?
MR. Km3O: Well, that is the only suggestion I would have, or
criticism, under the present system, that there is a possibility of your
being in a position where you don't have enough time to reflect on it.
But I think that there are several ways that that can be extended.
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Now, at the same time you can have too much time to make a
judgment. And a man that is running for President who hasn't given
some thought to the subject of "who my running mate is or might be"
until the night he is nominated is not apt to be nominated in the first
instance. I know we began early in the process to contemplate that.
And at the time of the nomination, we had a list that was informally
developed, that was not total, but it was a list out of which the
nominee selection came. So it was a matter of checking them out. And
I could see that we had more time, and I think it sometimes can be
increased and that would be of a certain help. But I was glad when the
time ran out, frankly. Because you can just go on and on, and every
day you are going to get some new names coming in.
MR. FEERICK: Mr. Kirbo, do you see any merit in the suggestion
of post-convention procedure for deliberating on a nominee for VicePresident?
MR. KIRmo: I think it ought to be decided by the same convention,
and it ought to be that maybe the convention time ought to be
stretched out some. But it presents all sort of problems about money
and about holding your people and all that. But I think that can be
reconciled, and I think there ought to be some more time involved.
DEAN REEDY: I want, since it has been raised, to address myself to
this problem of time for the selection of a Vice-President.
In my judgment that is the one thing we probably have under ideal
circumstances right now. I think we get a little too obsessed with
orderly procedure sometimes and assume virtues to orderly methods of
doing things that may not necessarily be there. Because to me the
conditions under which the Presidential nominee must act at the
convention bear a very strong resemblance to the conditions under
which he must act as President. If the man, if the Presidential
nominee, the night of the convention-I assume Mr. Kirbo is absolutely correct; any serious candidate would have given some thought to
it before that time-is incapable of making a prudent judgment on his
running mate, I would have very strong reservations as to how he
would handle himself in a conference with Mr. Brezhnev or if there
were a series of crises around the world. And I am not at all certain
that we would accomplish anything if we were to adopt a sort of
aseptic method of selecting the Vice-President, which is really what we
are trying to do with these various proposals. We are trying to say,
eliminate political considerations and do this on a logical, orderly
basis; I myself regard the Presidency as a political job. I don't think we
gain anything by trying to introduce elements of administration that
really don't apply.
There is one other point that I wanted to make. It seems to me that
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we have a little teleological question involved. Presumably, if we are
going to change the method of selecting the Vice-President, we are
doing it for the purpose of improving the Vice-Presidents that we are
going to get. From the conversation around this table, the major
criterion that I have heard so far as to the qualifications of a VicePresident is that he should be fit to be President. And I quite agree
with Mr. Kirbo; I don't think there is any on-the-job training. The
only way you get training as President is stepping into the White
House and starting to administer the place. Nothing prepares you for
it, nothing.
But if we assume that we are doing this because we want to get
better Vice-Presidents and if we assume a better Vice-President is a
man who can become President, shouldn't we address ourselves to the
qualifications of the President? Just what are the qualifications that
make a good President? If we can answer that, which I don't think we
can, then I think we can go ahead and say something sensible about
how you select a Vice-President.
MR. GOLDSTEIN: The idea of allowing the Presidential candidate
more time has an appeal to me partly, I think, because it seems to me
that no matter how well-intentioned the Presidential candidate is and
no matter how much thought he gives the question before his nomination, the circumstances aren't really right for him to give it a full
consideration in that he doesn't know whether someone will accept the
nomination. He doesn't know whether-he can't really go to a rival
candidate and say, "I would be interested in having you as my running
mate and I would like to see your medical reports and your financial
reports." To me this is one reason why the sort of post-convention
scheme that Senator Bayh suggests would have value in that it would
create an atmosphere in which the Presidential candidate could deal
with prospective running mates under conditions favorable to making
a rational choice.
MR. MITCHELL: With respect to Mr. Kirbo's observation on the
role of the convention, in choosing from a list of people that the
Presidential nominee would submit,

. .

. it would seem to me that Mr.

Kirbo's observations would make it appear that the delegates really
don't have the kind of impact that they think they ought to have and
the country thinks that they should have. I'm sorry to say, I think he is
right. I think we have got to change that. When people make the effort
to get elected as delegates to the convention they ought to have some
opportunity to influence the result in a way that the public can see and
which would mean that we seriously consider the importance of being
a delegate to the convention.
I believe the way to do that with respect to the Vice-President is to
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have a list submitted by the nominee, because I think such people
ought to be compatible with the President, and on which the delegates
have a bona fide opportunity to vote as individuals, not by a unit
system.
SENATOR GRIFFIN:
I might say, as President Ford's floor manager
at the recent Kansas City convention and having been a delegate at the
1968 convention when President Nixon was first nominated, I bring a
little different perspective, I think, from that of Mr. Kirbo, who
worked closely with a candidate whose nomination was assured well in
advance of the convention.
I think it was Mr. Young here at one point who rather lightly passed
over the fact that the Presidential nominee, of course, could
dictate-I am sure he didn't use these words-dictate his running
mate, and that would be more or less "automatically rubber-stamped."
Just for purposes of the record and to put this in some sort of historical
perspective, I think I might recall that in 1968, at Miami, Mr. Nixon
had a great deal of difficulty getting that nomination. Mr. Rockefeller
controlled the New York delegation. George Romney controlled the
Michigan delegation. Governor Rhodes controlled the Ohio delegation.
Governor Reagan controlled the California delegation. It went on and
on. And none of these people was going to put their delegates behind
Mr. Nixon at that convention. I can't say with authority that this was
the case, but it has been widely reported, and I don't know that it
has been denied, that the one way that Mr. Nixon finally became sure
of getting the Southern delegates to barely give him enough to get the
nomination was that they reached an understanding that the Southern
delegation would have a veto power on who would be nominated for
Vice-President.
Now, I wasn't as close to Mr. Nixon in the 1968 convention as I
was to President Ford in the recent one. If the situation was as I have
described it, then it certainly seems to introduce, I think, another
element or consideration which up to now I don't think has really been
emphasized. In conventions, then, some have the luxury of focusing on
the political considerations of getting elected in November, and others
must take into account getting the nomination. Sometimes those
considerations are much more immediate and allow a lot less time to
take various factors into account.
In the recent nomination of President Ford, it might be of some
interest that we seriously considered advancing a proposal at an early
stage of the convention to change the rules and provide that we delay
the adoption of the platform until after the President had been
nominated and then turn to the platform in order to have a day
intervening. But I think that it might be of interest, somewhat ironic

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

perhaps, that while we would have argued strongly that we wanted to
reform the process of selecting the Vice-President, one of the major
considerations would have been the advantage to the Ford camp of
delaying a possibly divisive battle on the convention floor over some
very divisive issues such as the Panama Canal until after the nominee
had gotten the nomination.
In the case of the selection of Bob Dole, I was one of nine people
who met with President Ford between the hours of three and 5:30 in
the morning, in the Brown Center Hotel. We recessed then and came
back about nine o'clock and met again until about 10:30. At 10:30, the
President had arrived at his decision, after consulting with the people
there. I think it should be emphasized, however, that a lot of work and
a lot of staff investigation had gone into the identification and checking
qualifications and background of some two dozen people well in
advance of that meeting, and that at that point President Ford, as has
been reported in the press-I'm not really saying anything that is not
already public-had more or less narrowed the choice down to four
and asked for advice and suggestions and discussion concerning those
four. He believed strongly, and I think everyone there did, that every
one of those four people was well qualified to be President of the
United States. We start with that.
I think the question that remains, however, is: to what extent do
other factors enter in and to what extent is it in the interests of the
country, for example, that they do? Joseph Kraft has written a column
about the fact that one consideration in selecting Bob Dole was that he
was acceptable to the Reagan camp, and that is a consideration of a
kind that Mr. Carter didn't have to take into account.
I end up my own analysis of the whole process concluding that,
while Arthur Schlesinger's suggestion has a lot of merit, I agree with
Birch Bayh that the people really want a Vice-President, and that it
would be too divisive and disruptive in many instances to have a
special election.
I then go to the next stage of my thinking and suggest that the
people really don't have very much to say in the present process. It is
very limited, in any event. Certainly they have very little to say in
terms of the selection of the nominee at the convention. Once he is
selected and coupled with the Presidential nominee, it seems to me that
the public has very little to say, really, in the election of a VicePresident.
MR. FEERICK: In terms of selection, Governor Peabody has suggested earlier today, and in a number of speeches and articles, that he
thinks one way we can improve the entire process is to encourage
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candidates for the Vice-Presidency to run for the office, to run in
primaries. Senator Smith has advocated, I believe, a similar concept
with reference to the Vice-Presidency. I vould like to ask Senator
Smith to comment on whether we should change the selection process
along the lines that have been recommended. Don't you think if we
had a separate election for the Vice-President along the lines of a direct
primary, the potential danger is to bring together a team that can't
function together because they come through a different selection
mechanism and potentially may be independent of each other?
SENATOR SMITH: That doesn't seem to be a problem, as far as I
am concerned. I would have both the President and the Vice-President
nominated by direct primary. I have felt that through the years, as I
think is well known. I think that we have differences between the
executive and the legislative branch and it hasn't brought about too
much of a problem. No, I would trust the American people, if you
could get them to realize what their responsibility is.
What people want, I think, is a part in the election of the VicePresident, and this they are not getting through the convention.
I may be subjective in this, but I had an experience which I will
take just a minute to tell you about. In 1952 there was a group who
proposed me for Vice-President. I didn't do anything about it. But they
had about 250 pledged votes for me. With the contest between Taft
and Eisenhower, there was such a rift and so much bitterness on the
part of the Taft forces that they threatened to vote for me against
Richard Nixon. So, under the advice of Governor Dewey, General
Eisenhower sent word down to the floor: "By no means let Margaret
Smith's name come up for a vote, because she has 250 pledged
delegates who with the Taft forces will create a split the party cannot
stand!"
This is why I said if they are going to continue with the convention
system, then let us require the candidates to submit a list two days
before the day of the voting, of not less than three who would be
acceptable as running mates. I think this would be very logical and
very easy to follow. I don't understand what is meant by Presidential
candidates not knowing what they are going to do. No one becomes a
Presidential candidate overnight. And I am sure no one runs for
President without giving some thought about those people he would
like to have around him. So I don't have much patience with the
feeling that you have to have extra time beyond the convention, if they
are going to continue with a convention system.
MR. FEERICK: I take it from what you said that you would require
a Presidential candidate to submit the names of three or four people
before he was nominated as the candidate?
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SENATOR SMITH: That's right, I would require he either call for an
open convention or submit a list of not less than three at least two days
before the day of voting so that the people theinselves would know
what was going on.
PROF. KIRBY: I think there is another factor here, too, that we
have to remember. The selection of the Vice-President is a very
important part of the political process itself. I think that this is one of
the means through which we sustain a degree of unity in this country.
I can still remember Kennedy saying to Johnson that he wanted to be
President of a united country but he certainly couldn't be President of
a united country unless he could be the leader of a united party, and he
could certainly not be the leader of a united party, in his judgment,
unless he and Johnson could get together somehow, because at that
particular moment in history they represented the major wings of the
Democratic Party. And by putting Johnson on the ticket, he was
actually solving a problem of unity, and unity is an extraordinarily
important thing in our country. You can't manage the country unless
you can keep it together and, to a certain extent, I don't think a
President knows all of his problems until after he has arrived at the
convention.
Conventions are wonderful in one respect. They are a microcosm of
the political process. They combine the whole political process into two
or three days, all of the frustrations, all of the tensions, and I think
that decisions of this kind are much better made under the tensions of
a convention and after the President-elect has had an opportunity to
see with what he must really cope.
I don't trust the decisions that he makes before he gets to that
convention. The decisions that he makes before he gets to the convention are rational solutions-and by that, I mean solutions that follow
certain patterns of logic-which may bear no resemblance whatsoever
to the real situation that exists in the country. And I am very, very
hesitant to start recommending so-called positive ways of doing something unless, first of all, I can see that it will give the Vice-President a
separate political base; second, give him that separate political base
without doing violence to our society; and third, unless it offers some
method of making up the various unifying factors that are capable of
being arrived at through the present means of selection of the VicePresident.
Presumably, if we are going to change the method of selecting the
Vice-President, it is because we want a better Vice-President, and I
submit: what are the standards of a better Vice-President? Just what
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can we do that is going to guarantee that we have better VicePresidents or, for that matter, better Presidents?
SENATOR GRIFFIN: May I add, John Kennedy not only unified the
party but won the election.
DEAN REEDY: South Carolina and a couple of other places, yes.
PROF. KIRBY: I don't think it is that we want a better VicePresident at the time he is chosen to be a running mate. We want a
better Vice-President at the time he succeeds to the Presidency-and I
was impressed with Dr. Schlesinger's arguments this morning that
Vice-Presidents tend to diminish in office as they have been used in
recent years-with something to keep his spiritual muscle from withering. Giving him responsibility, actual and apparent, seems to be the
best way to do that.
MR. SPANN: I am here in an ex officio capacity, but I have certain
observations from my listening. Governor Peabody earlier today talked
about standards for the Vice-Presidency, and he suggested that the first
standard was to be qualified to be President, an obvious standard;
secondly, to help the ticket get elected-and then later suggested it
might also be helping the candidate get the nomination as one further
step on the route; his third, that he be compatible with the President.
These may or may not be standards which can be applied. I think in
many instances they turn out to be inconsistent standards. The man
who may help the ticket to get elected, help the candidate obtain the
nomination, may not necessarily be the best qualified or available
person to be President. And selecting him on the basis of getting the
ticket elected, which perhaps was the case in the Kennedy-Johnson
situation, doesn't mean there is going to be compatibility. To try to get
them all into this system, it seems to me, is an almost impossible
objective.
We talked a lot about Carter-Mondale. It is the obvious thing to talk
a lot about, since it just happened. I think Mr. Mitchell's fears
probably are not justified. I think it will work the way you think it
should. Often only an incumbent President with a good chance of
being nominated without opposition can look down the line as to
whom he wants as his running mate. Carter had that opportunity and
he worked at it. I know we had about five different people going in
and out of Plains, spending a day or two down there and talking to
him, and so on. I think in this peculiar circumstance, and because he
had the fortunate opportunity of making that sort of selection, that you
perhaps had more compatibility than you would have in a different
situation. In fact, you did have the pre-screening and study opportunity which some of these proposals have suggested ought to be done. I
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am at a loss to believe that 36 hours would be much better than
twelve. The fact that the decision is made in twelve hours, the idea
that one more day would make very much more of a difference-I
think it takes a longer time than that. Maybe 36 is better than twelve,
but not by any great degree.
Still, I don't see how, in the present system, you divorce the purely
political elements from the objective of having a first-class, top-notch
standby President, if that is what you want to call him.
These are reactions that I have had in listening. I can't find any
consensus. I don't envy the American Bar Association Committee's job
tomorrow in coming up and telling us what was decided, what they
were led to believe by the panel discussion, as valuable as it is.
Independent election has been mentioned. I think this could be a
tragedy. You can get complete incompatibility in this. Of course,
Governor Peabody mentioned his Lieutenant Governor. I take it that
is an independent election, isn't it?
Gov. PEABODY: It used to be.
MR. SPANN: It still is in Georgia. And one thing the Carter
campaign has never said very loudly, is that the reason he really didn't
do all he claims to have done for the State of Georgia was that his
Lieutenant Governor was Lester Maddox, and Lester did control the
Senate. He made the committee appointments. While Carter had a
working majority in both the lower House and the Senate in Georgia,
he didn't control the Rules Committee; Lester did. And he couldn't get
many things on the calendar. He was frustrated for four years.
There was really no point in saying this in the national election; it
was water over the dam. But this was an independent election
situation. He was independently selected. This I think would be a far
worse situation nationally.
I suppose I am coming down to the view that I have not heard
anything about change that would indicate to me that we have any
bright prospect which would improve greatly on what we have already.
MR. FEERICK: What about Mr. Mitchell's suggestion of requiring a
Presidential candidate to submit a list of prospective nominees with
whom he would feel compatible? Do you have any reaction to that?
MR. SPANN: He might submit such a list; of course, it ought to be
a bona fide list. Another thing that bothers me is: when do you submit
it, immediately after he is nominated? Nobody has told us that.
MR. MITCHELL: I am a practical person in political operation. If
the prospective Presidential nominee had to designate somebody as his
running mate before he got the nomination, he might very well never
get the nomination. I would think that I have a lot more confidence in
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the common sense of Presidential nominees than maybe some other
people have. But it would be inconceivable for me that a person like
Governor Carter, as I have listened to him-I don't pretend to know
him personally, I have talked with him-it would be inconceivable to
me that he wouldn't have enough common sense, integrity and belief
in the people of this country that he would fail to submit a really bona
fide list of prospective Vice-Presidential candidates with whom he
could work. If you lose that faith in people, you lose faith in everything.
Assuming that I am correct with that assessment of Governor
Carter, I would assume that once he got the nomination, he would
submit to the convention a list of people that he honestly felt were
capable and people that he could work with. In my judgment, that
would be very helpful to the delegates in reaching a conclusion that
they had meaningful participation in the convention, which they don't
now have.
MR. SPANN: Well, I am sympathetic to the idea of meaningful
participation. Some way ought to be developed to give it to them.
On the other hand, if the list is to be submitted immediately after
the nomination of the President, the delegates are going to have little
chance to appraise and select among the three or five people that may
be on the list which the nominee would be tendering to them. But if
the list were submitted in advance, it may as you say hurt his chances
of getting the nomination. Secondly, there is always the possibility that
he may want to submit someone who has been a rival Presidential
candidate, and obviously he couldn't submit that in advance. He
could, of course, after he has gotten the nomination. And this person
would have been evaluated, of course, because he sought the Presidential nomination, but others would not have been evaluated by the
delegates, and I don't know that they could give meaningful input in
the short time that they had after the Presidential nominee said, "Here
is my list" and they have to have a vote.
I think the idea of pre-screening of candidates is desirable. Carter
had that opportunity, as you said. But there are going to be many
instances when this is not possible, so that any general answer doesn't
seem to me to meet all situations.
DEAN JACKSON: I am disappointed by Professor Schlesinger's
somewhat cynical attitude about the possibility that Governor Carter
or future Presidents will feel an obligation to use their Vice-Presidents
more wisely or more effectively.
There are two aspects, selection of the Vice-President and utilization
of the Vice-President. And I think in terms of the selection process,
only four years ago we had Agnew and Eagleton, and four years later I
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think we found Governor Carter conducting the most thoughtful,
professional and thorough Vice-Presidential screening process in American history. He did have the luxury of time, but that doesn't fully
explain Mr. Kirbo's going through the financial records and medical
data with a full-time staff of aides months in advance of the convention. It doesn't fully explain his personal interviewing of five prominent candidates chosen not exclusively, I think, for their political
value. And I think we have seen the media giving heightened importance to the office of the Vice-Presidency. We saw the Democrats
conducting exhaustive debates through their Vice-Presidential Commission chaired by Senator Humphrey.
The Republican Rule 29 Committee was similarly motivated and
some members worked to change the agenda of the 1976 convention,
and Ronald Reagan proposed 16-C, which I thought was a bad idea, I2
but again elevated the office and the importance of the selection
process. The Vice-Presidential debates were unprecedented, and were
televised.
I think we are seeing reforms, increased importance and greater
public expectations about the process of Vice-Presidential selection,
and I don't think we can dismiss that cynically. I, for one, am
optimistic that 1977 can be a good year for setting precedents in
utilization of the Vice-President. We can't dismiss the possibility of
public expectations that Vice-Presidents will be used, as Mr. Mitchell
has suggested, for substantial positions of public responsibility. I think
if the same attitude prevailed four years ago, we would still have
Presidents issuing Gulf of Tonkin resolutions and palming money and
perhaps even conducting Watergates.
DEAN REEDY:
I think Mr. Jackson has illustrated a point I have
been trying to make. A thoughtful President will use thoughtful
processes in selecting his Vice-Presidential candidate. A thoughtless
President will use thoughtless processes in selecting his VicePresidential candidate. An aggressive President may look for a gut
fighter in selecting a Vice-Presidential candidate.
The point is this, that your problem again is not with the VicePresident but with the Presidency itself. And I think that if we are
trying to get a better process of Vice-Presidential selection, I submit
once more, what we must do is get to the process of how to select a
President, what process do you have that guarantees that you are
going to get a thoughtful President who makes a thoughtful decision?
12. The Rule 29 Committee was created at the 1972 Republican convention for the purpose of
recommending any needed changes in the conduct of future conventions. Its final report, on
January 1, 1975, recommended further study. Proposed Rule 16-C at the 1976 convention would
have mandated disclosure by each Presidential hopeful, in advance of any balloting, of the name
of his preferred running mate.
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You are not, in my judgment, going to be able to enact any law that
will make a thoughtless President a thoughtful one. And I think that
what happens is when a thoughtless President thoughtlessly selects a
Vice-President, he usually gets defeated because that act in and of
itself is a symbol of the kind of President he would be.
This, again, is why I am so very uneasy about proposals to tie the
President's hands. Because I think that the Presidential candidate in
making his selection of the Vice-President is telling the people of the
United States something very important. He is revealing there what
kind of man he is in the manner by which he makes the selection.

Better Screening of Vice-Presidential Candidates
MR. FEERICK:
Senator Bayh, you have proposed that the parties
select Vice-Presidential nominees by a secret ballot of the delegates a
few days after the nominating convention. How can we screen the
candidates for Vice-President once they are proposed? I think we only
have to go back four years. As we all know, we had a VicePresidential candidate of one party who after the election had to resign
from office because of conduct committed prior to his Vice-Presidency,
and we have had a candidate of the other party having to withdraw
from the ticket before the election following certain health disclosures.
How do we guard against that type of future occurrence in the
suggestion that you have made?
SENATOR BAYH: That is, I think, a reasonable question. But if one
is to follow it to its logical conclusion, then Arthur Schlesinger's idea of
having no Vice-President at all is the only way you can protect yourself
from it, because we are talking about small amounts of differencewhether it is twenty-four hours or twelve hours after a heated and
extended nominating process, whether it is 48 or 72 hours under the
Harvard plan, 13 or whether it is a month-that gives the nominee, his
advisors, the press, time to go at some of these trial balloons. The
reason, I feel, is that we are striving for a fine enough screening to
protect us from a rotten egg. Let me say history has shown it is awfully
hard to make a screen that fine and we have not found one yet,
because the specific example that you mentioned, the Agnew
example-you are talking about a man who was nominated for VicePresident twice, was elected Vice-President twice, and served in the
office for four years and we still didn't have a chance to screen out the
imperfection that later came to light.
So I don't think that we can really effectively strive for absolute
13.

See note 5 supra.
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perfection, but by creating a period, a buffer zone, a time in which the
Kirbos and the Carters and McGoverns and the others can have a
chance to sit down and contemplate, that we are giving ourselves a
better chance of protection. But we are never going to reach perfection.
During the Presidential primary process, PresiMR. ARMSTRONG:
dential candidates have their backgrounds fully scrutinized and examined. Too often, the Vice-Presidential nominee is only scrutinized and
examined after he has been nominated. What methods might be
employed to more carefully examine the backgrounds, see if there are
any skeletons in the closet?
It is something we examined during the Harvard
DEAN JACKSON:
study. There are basically three ways you can go about checking.
You can have good staff work early on; you can undergo a thorough
process of party consultation, which may be a formalized system. I
know that Dean Reedy opposes that. We did propose a formal party
consultative mechanism similar to the one which Senator Humphrey's
commission proposed.
The third and most obvious is FBI background investigation. We
felt strongly that to improvise, without legislative approval, FBI
background investigations in 1976 would have been irresponsible,
although administratively and legally feasible.
Senator Brock has introduced a bill, 14 which has not received
serious discussion in the Congress, I don't believe, to authorize Presidential candidates to submit up to ten names to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation for thorough background investigation up to, I think,
three months before the convention, upon the written consent of those
ten potential Vice-Presidential nominees, with the guarantee of absolute privacy, and a $50,000 fine and a mandatory five-year prison
sentence attached for violations. I don't think those are adequate
safequards against abuse and misuse of that information, and the
reason our committee didn't resolve this is that we felt there is a
danger of repoliticizing the FBI and making them a part of the
political process. "Re-politicizing," yes, emphasizing the "re."
PROF. SCHLESINGER:
I honestly think that this whole notion that
we should establish a form of scrutiny of potential Vice-Presidential
candidates is a terrible idea. I mean, from what we know about the
FBI, first about the use to which it has been put and second about its
own incompetence, why should we assume this is going to give some
kind of sacred judgment on the merits of candidates? They investigated G. Harrold Carswell for months and failed to discover allega14.

S. 2741, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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tions that he was a racist. This notion of confiding anything to the FBI
or any other governmental investigative agency is very wrong. This is
something where we have to stand or fall on the democratic process.
The democratic process is not infallible. One supposes that the electoral process in an adversary situation is likely to bring up any
problems with people who are likely to be nominated. But it did not
work in the case of Eagleton. He had been through several elections in
Missouri, a state with several good newspapers, and everything had
failed in that instance. But through most of American history the
electoral process, the adversary process has been perfectly adequate.
Rather than this whole theory that we should confide in a bunch
of flatfoots in the scrutiny of candidates, the judgment on candidates ought to be made by the people through the conventional
processes, and I think on the whole that has worked very well, and I
strongly deplore the demeaning notion of why we should do more
about Vice-Presidents in this regard than we do about Presidents. If
you really think that you have to go through the tax returns and the
private lives, why stop at the Vice-Presidency? The Presidency is a far
more serious office; why not do it for Presidents? Why, if we don't
subject Presidents to it, -is the whole apparatus of snoops and spies and
so on, invoked as to this meaningless and inconsequential office as if
you are going to save the country?
MR. FEERICK: What about the recommendation about a party
mechanism, an advisory committee?
PROF. SCHLESINGER: I think if we are going to stick with this
horrible office, that all of this business of the submission of lists and
every effort to try to solve, as George Reedy has said, a political
problem by structural means is a mistake. If the party doesn't have in
its own processes through the convention, a judgment on the quality of
candidates, then the notion that you can establish a kind of party
snooping commission, which is going to hale these people up, then
have it for the important office, which is the Presidency. But the notion
that the Presidential candidates are exempt from all this but the poor
old Vice-Presidential candidates have to come up and show somebody
their income tax returns is, it seems to me, illogical, demeaning, and
I am against it.
Gov. PEABODY: In concurrence, I think that the safety factor is a
disclosure of candidacy in advance of the convention, as my proposals
would employ. Then it is left to the delegates, the party, the press, to
comment on their qualifications and put it up to the candidate himself
who is an announced candidate to disclose his qualifications in advance of the convention. Then if they still were not disclosed, then we
must ride on it. Probably lots of things are not disclosed about many

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

candidates for Vice-President or President which have not come to the
fore, but we have to take this chance with the adversary process and
the democratic process.
MR. MITCHELL: I agree with Arthur about the matter that you
don't want investigative agencies prying into the personal affairs of the
people who are running for public office, and that the people ought to
be the judge. But with respect to structure, the structure is already
there. The only thing lacking is the chance for the people to get in on
it, and the only way I see you can do that is to bring it out into the
open and give the people an opportunity to vote. It is a fiction to
assume that in American political life there is no structure, because it
is there, and it is against the public interest for the most part.
MR. GOLDEN: We have had responsible members of the press here
all day, and some of our panelists are established and highly experienced journalists. I wonder if I might throw a question out to the press
or those people on the panel who write.
James Reston, on May 19, 1976, wrote: "Reporters of press, radio
and television are usually accused of being too nosey in their questions
to Presidential candidates. And sometimes they are. But on the problem of picking Vice-Presidents,
they have probably been too casual
15
indifferent."
even
and
Can the press help us in any way in making the Vice-Presidential
selection process better than it is?
MR. BAAB: I am not a journalist but it seems the press doesn't
have much of an opportunity to assist in the process as you are
suggesting, because we don't know who the Vice-Presidential candidate is until after the convention and there is not much time between
then and the election. I think it would be a different story if you had a
Vice-Presidential candidate campaigning with the President throughout all of the primaries, not just in one, as Governor Peabody
suggested, but a good many of them. I don't see how you could do it
any other way. The hopeful Vice-President ought to be campaigning in
all the primaries.
MR. GOLDSTEIN: I think we have been focusing largely on the
selection process and the duties of the office. As I suggested, these are
really two aspects of the problem. But it seems to me there is really a
third aspect, maybe the most resistant to reform. Yet, I think it is
important to mention it. And that is the election.
15.
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